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Abstract
Metamorphic malware are the most challenging threat in digital world, which are quite advanced and have actually reduced the
signiﬁcance of signature based detection. These malware use code obfuscation to mutate and have numerous forms thus increasing
the size of signature database; make it unmanageable and incomplete to cover all variants. This is the major reason why no anti-virus
company can claim 100% detection even for non zero day malware.
When a malware is encrypted or packed, Static analysis is not possible. In such cases, Dynamic analysis appears to be most
obvious solution. But the challenge lies in ﬁnding out how to analyze behavior to detect malware in automated manner and how
to quantize behavior. An approach is required here that speciﬁes how to analyze dynamic report and how can we prepare a model
which can help make detection decision. This is what we will be looking for in this paper.
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1. Introduction
Malware have been a threat, which many anti-virus try to mitigate. There has been enormous development in both
ﬁelds-malware and anti-virus techniques. Undefeated developments for some time in malware are polymorphic and
metamorphic malware. Polymorphic malware are those where malware variants are produced using encryption with
different encryption key. These malware have a decryption engine which may be common and whose signature may
be used for detection. Metamorphic malware use changes in code to mutate itself, this is called Code Obfuscation.
Code obfuscation can be achieved by inserting garbage instruction, equivalent code substitution, register renaming,
subroutine permutation or code reordering. Thus, these variants are functionally equivalent but have different structure
and thus their signatures are different.
Malware can be analyzed statically or dynamically. If a malware is analyzed without actually running or executing it
is called Static analysis. If a malware is analyzed by executing and understanding its behaviors, the technique is called
Dynamic analysis. Static analysis is difﬁcult to achieve, if a malware is encrypted or packed. Also it is made difﬁcult
by increasing size or complexity of code or using predicates.
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Problem that we wish to address in this paper is identiﬁcation of Metamorphic Malware. As, we cannot rely
on signature based detection or static methods for reasons mentioned above. In this paper, a simple way to
perform dynamic analysis to understand the behavior of code is suggested. The difﬁculty lies in quantifying
behavior of Portable Executable (PE) and uses this to make suitable decision about PE being malicious. Another
aspect covered in this paper is designing of classiﬁer to analyze dynamic behavior reports using machine learning
methods. Our approach is unique in sense that it uses methods which are very simple and cannot be detected
easily.
2. Related Work
Dynamic malware analysis has been explored in many ways but none of the methods guarantees complete code
coverage as there exists numerous execution paths and it may not be possible to cover those paths which have not
got executed. Furthermore malware on detecting presence of analysis tools or virtualization may cease to exhibit its
malicious behavior. Logic bomb and conditional code, which expects certain logic/or input e.g. Time can be applied
to further hinder the analysis. Some of the important techniques include binary hooking, API call hooking, running in
sandbox or virtual machine, using machine learning, multiple path execution, instruction trace and data ﬂow analysis
etc.
Bayer et al.1 presented a method where binary is run in open source PC emulator Qemu2 to monitor its
security relevant activities by analyzing windows native call or API call. It did not modify binary to prevent
detection by malware and uses hooks and breakpoints implanted in relevant API and native libraries.
Work on Multiple path exploration has been conducted by Moser et al.3 by using tools that recognize branching
point and using tools that take snapshot to reset to branching point state so that it does not have to traverse entire path
each time.
Willems et al.4 implemented CWSandbox using hook function for API and system calls. It captures behavior in
respect of ﬁle system, registry manipulation, network communications and OS interaction. It implemented hook by
replacing ﬁrst ﬁve byte of API with non conditional jump to monitor function and also captured passed parameters for
analysis.
Norman sandbox5 executed binary in virtual environment simulating windows. It replaced functions required by
binary to instrument it for analysis and it prevents access by binary executable of real system thereby securing system
from malware access.
Joebox6 is implemented in client server architecture and runs binary on real hardware and not virtual or emulated
environment. It hooks on SSDT (System Service Descriptor Table) for monitoring malware activities.
Ether7 has been implemented by Dinaburg et al. which provides transparent analysis framework based on hardware
virtualization. Virtualization has been implemented in Xen hypervisor. Monitor function records debug exception and
has modiﬁed instruction that allow access to CPU ﬂags.
Anderson et al.11 used the markov chain of instruction trace to make graph kernel and made similarity matrix
based on transition probability between instructions. Such similarity matrix sent to Support Vector Machine for
classiﬁcation. He used Ether malware analysis framework based on Xen Virtual machine for execution of binary. He
had identiﬁed 160 basic instructions to be monitored and did similarity check based on Guassian and Eigen vector
method.
Yin et al.8 implemented Panorama system that captures system wide view of how a tested sample interacts with
sensitive information. It applies data and address tainting, where taint source can be hardware, network communication
or hard disk. It creates taint graph representing process and modules that operate on tainted data. This uses Qemu
emulator.
Lee and Mody9 executes binary in virtual environment and uses K-medoid clustering to deﬁne malware groups.
Samples are used to train and once training completes, it assigns closest cluster to tested binary and thus help which
class of malware binary belongs.
Rieck et al.10 use behavioral information derived from CWSandbox report and use SVM (Support Vector Machine)
to build classiﬁer for classifying individual malware family.
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Fig. 1. System design overview.
3. System Design
None of the works discussed in related work focus on operations/tasks performed by malicious or benign ﬁles. The
work here focuses on monitoring operations performed by PE as Feature, which is being used for classifying Benign
or malware. These are recorded as report. Such reports are used for supervised learning of a classiﬁer, which is being
trained to classify malware. Once a classiﬁer model is made it can be tested and used for real world samples.
3.1 Dynamic features of an executable
When any executable runs it may fork child process and thus it may not be a lone process which needs monitoring.
Whenever an executable executes some of its important characteristics which can be used for dynamic analysis are:
• Operations performed by the process as well as child process. It is the most important aspect which needs
monitoring in Dynamic analysis. This can be monitored by privileged application which has access to kernel
functions.
• Location at which operation is performed. This can be monitored using action taken and locations called by API
calls.
• Parameters passed during such operation. This is also a major source of information as parameters passed by
malware and benign are different.
There is also a requirement to check whether executable or DLLs loaded during execution are veriﬁed by reliable
originator and have not been altered. This parameter is a very strong tool to prevent any unauthorized execution. This
can be veriﬁed by checking SHA hash of executable with signed hash provided by reliable originator. This check must
be done before loading an executable and libraries for execution in Dynamic analysis scenario. But this can be checked
as part of static analysis also, since it need not be executed for this checking.
Keeping all the aspects mentioned above, executable is executed under monitor to generate report regarding its
behavior. Then, these reports are taken for further processing.
3.2 Training of model using data mining over generated reports
Once we run executable and generate their dynamic report. The next problems that an analyst faces are as follows:
• How to analyze various reports of various executable to make sense? Say if 1000 samples of known executable
are run, we have 1000 reports each containing large details of operation conducted, location used and parameter
passed by these operations.
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Table 1. Portion of Dynamic-Report of a Benign PE (notepad.exe). Here in 1st entry, we see “notepad.exe” has created a ﬁle at location
“C:/Windows/” and it is a veriﬁed program of “Microsoft Corporation”, i.e. SHA is checked. Its desired access is “Read”.
Process Name PID Operation Path Detail Company
notepad.exe 616 CreateFile C:/Windows/System32 Desired Access: Generic Microsoft
notepad.exe 616 CloseFile C:/Windows/System32/notepad.exe Microsoft
notepad.exe 616 Load Image C:/Windows/System32/notepad.exe Image Base: 0xc0000 Microsoft
notepad.exe 616 Load Image C:/Windows/System32/ntdll.dll Image Base: 0x77240000 Microsoft
notepad.exe 616 CreateFile C:/Windows/Prefetch Access: Read Microsoft
notepad.exe 616 QueryStandardInfo C:/Windows/Prefetch AllocationSize: 45,056 Microsoft
• How machine can be used to perform this task? How should one extract understanding what benign executable
do and what malware do. How to make classiﬁer model based on these report and how could machine learning
be used in this.
Although there can be many way, approach selected in this paper is as follows. The counts of all the word of
the report are calculated. The value of this count is normalized i.e. count divided by total number of words. Then
information gain is calculated for each word based on their frequency of occurrence in benign and malware. Based
on their relevance for decision of malware or benign, weight is assigned to each word, which tend to pull or push it
on either side of decision. Combining all such push along with weight helps decide ﬁnally executable should be placed
in which class-malware or benign. This method of classiﬁcation is called text mining, where based on occurrence of
text, model decide the class of executable.
3.3 Relevance of text mining in classiﬁcation
Our objective in dynamic analysis is to see pattern of operation at speciﬁc location, performed by executable, each
operation and each location is different text word in generated dynamic report. If we see frequency of such word, it
is equivalent to frequency of operation. Similarly frequency of location accessed is also equivalent to frequency of
occurrence of that location as word. To analyze the pattern of these frequencies, their occurrence range in each class
(benign, malware) is analyzed. Based on their more occurrence in particular class (i.e. information gain), weight is
assigned. Thus prominence of a word in particular class gives it more weight. This weight tends to take it towards its
class. Finally cumulative value of relevant word frequencies leads to a decision in particular class.
So, we use all above mentioned concepts in our experiment. We take samples of malware and benign prepare
dynamic report. Then these reports are used to train a classiﬁer which in our case is Support Vector Machine (SVM).
This SVM does text mining of the report and prepares a classiﬁer, which can be used for classiﬁcation of any new
binary executable.
4. Conduct of Experiment
4.1 Dynamic analysis of executable
There were 97 executable from OS picked as benign sample and 91 different varieties of malware samples were
picked from various source12. To analyse operations and location of operation, executable is run for 100 seconds in
virtual environment provided by Oracle virtualbox13. Process monitor14 provided by Microsoft sysinternal is used as
monitoring function to generate report of its operations, location and operation details. This report needs to be ﬁltered
for malware process and its child. Examples of such report for benign and malware sample are shown below in Table 1
and 2 respectively. Operation, memory location, detail, company of report are utilized for our analysis.
4.2 Text mining of dynamic report
After generating report, these reports are mined using WEKA15. Two classes of benign and malware created, each
word counted, important word based on information gain selected. These words and their frequency used to generate
a classiﬁer model and the model is cross validated using test set of samples.
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Table 2. Portion of dynamic-report of a malware. Here we can see, general pattern of operation are signiﬁcantly different for malware. This fact
will be used for our classiﬁcation.
Process Name PID Operation Path Detail Company
malware.exe 2900 Thread Create Thread ID: 2948
malware.exe 2900 Load Image C:/Users/spc3067/Desktop Image Base: 0x400000
malware.exe 2900 Load Image C:/Windows/System32/kernel32.dll Image Base: 0x753f0000
malware.exe 2900 RegOpenKey HKLM/System/CurrentControlSet Access: Query, Set Value
malware.exe 2900 RegOpenKey HKLM/System/ Access: Read
malware.exe 2900 RegOpenKey HKLM/Software/Policies/ Access: Query Value
malware.exe 2900 RegQueryValue HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/ Length: 80
Fig. 2. Attribute selection in Dynamic Malware Analysis. Here, we can see for query basic information ﬁle attribute has 0-occurrence in benign
whereas, 1.62–3.29 occurrence in malware ﬁle. 1.62 or 3.29 are normalised value and calculated as (no of occurrence/total no of words in report ﬁle).
Table 3. Snippet of classiﬁer model. Here normalised count of corresponding word is multiplied with a weight and added. (0.8666) in last row is
threshold.
===Classiﬁer model ===
0.9695 * (normalized) hklm/system/currentcontrolset/control/terminal
+ − 0.4132 * (normalized) closeﬁle
+ − 0.0469 * (normalized) regenumvalue
+ − 0.1833 * (normalized) querystandardinformationﬁle
+ − 0.1195 * (normalized) querynameinformationﬁle
+ − 0.0905 * (normalized) /windows/system32/msvcrt
.
.
+ − 0.1178 * (normalized) hkcu/software/microsoft/windows/currentversion/explorer/user
+0.8666
Table 4. Confusion matrix.
a b classiﬁed as
97 0 a = benign
4 87 b = malware
4.3 Report mining module and classiﬁer model (support vector machine)
The Report Mining Module generates a classiﬁer model after selection of attributes. Now, Attributes are selected
based on rank of their Information gain value. These attributes Information gain values are then used to generate
weights in Support Vector Machine Model which classiﬁes Benign and Malware samples.
Classiﬁer model selected is Support Vector Machine, which is considered best for Text Mining. Snapshot of
Classiﬁer Model is given in Table 3. It uses 231 attributes as features based on their information-gain value. The
occurrence of these attributes get multiplied by their weights, these are then added and checked against a threshold.
Threshold is used to classify whether executable is Benign or Malware.
5. Result Analysis
Tables below gives snapshot of result of Dynamic model. The results of Dynamic report classiﬁcation model shows
188 (91 malware+ 97 benign) samples have been run with 10 fold cross validation. The model has correctly classiﬁed
97 samples as Benign and 87 samples asMalware class. It has made 4 errors i.e. 4 malware samples have been classiﬁed
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as benign. 97.8% instances are are correctly classiﬁed. These results are promising and justify that this experiment
need to be taken further by increasing the sample space.
6. Conclusion
The results achieved by the method proposed here seems to be promising, since these features differentiate the
metamorphic malware from benign executables effectively. Dynamic analysis signiﬁes execution of executable to
understand its behavior which is being demonstrated here. The results achieved shows great accuracy, indicating that
this method can be improved further by using larger sample space. It can also be used to build further a system which
will be able to cluster and determine class of malware by using larger sample space to train for clustering. If more
samples are taken more accurate attributes can be selected and the precision of system can be improved to achieve
better classiﬁcation of a metamorphic malware.
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